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Abstract 
Baseball has been around for over a hundred years and has suffered through many 
difficult times. Since 1994, baseball has spiraled downward into deep economic 
instability. The structure of baseball's current economic system is causing a lack of 
competitive balance as well as a deterioration of fan base. Baseball has fallen off of its 
pedestal as the "national pastime" into recognition as a boring sport driven by money. In 
this thesis, I have attempted to uncover the reasons for the demise of baseball since 1994 
as well as some recommendations to saving the game of baseball. I have divided this 
thesis into three parts: a brief history of Major League Baseball before 1994, the current 
state of baseball economics since 1994, and recommendations on how to save the game 
of baseball. 
In the first section, I take a look at many developments since the beginning of 
baseball that have helped to contribute to baseball's current economic status. In this 
history, I have outlined many events such as the birth of television and radio revenues, 
free agency, and the creation of two leagues to help show the growth of baseball over 
time. These events follow a chronological pattern and end at the labor dispute of 1994 
resulting in the cancellation of the World Series. 
In the second section, I analyze the factors since 1994 that have brought baseball 
to its state of instability. With the Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Report on the 
Economics of Baseball as my guide, I explore such factors as revenue sharing, local 
revenues, contraction, free agency, player's salaries, and team payrolls as contributing 
factors to baseball's decline. Through this section, the information needed to make 
proper recommendations on saving baseball are conjectured. 
i 
In the third and final section, I provide the ideas and recommendations that could 
possibly save the game of baseball. Some recommendations include revenue sharing 
changes, a salary cap, franchise relocation, and amateur player draft reforms. With the 
implementation of these ideas, baseball has the opportunity to launch itself back to the 
forefront of professional sports. 
ii 
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Introduction 
Baseball has always been known as "America's Pastime." Baseball has been in 
existence for over a hundred years and has transcended many major events, such as both 
world wars, The Great Depression, the cold war, and the tragic events of September 11, 
2001. This sport has captivated the nation and became a symbol of everything our 
country stands for. 
Since the strike of 1994, which did the unthinkable, cancel the World Series for 
the first time in the history of Major League Baseball, the fans of the game have lost 
interest in the game. This loss of interest has been attributed to the lack of 
competitiveness that is directly related to the poor economic structure of Major League 
Baseball. Fans are no longer interested in baseball because professional baseball has lost 
its luster as a game that everyone can relate to and become a big business driven by 
making money. Baseball's flawed economic structure also has contributed to a surge in 
ticket prices and concession prices, a trend that threatens to compromise baseball's 
traditional role as the "national pastime" and its important niche as affordable family 
entertainment in the professional sports marketplace."l 
In the mid 1990's, people began to note the lack of competitive balance in Major 
League Baseball. In July of 2000, the commissioner of Major League Baseball, Bud 
Selig, appointed Richard C. Levin, George J. Mitchell, Paul A. Vo1cker, and George F. 
Will to examine whether baseball's current economic system has created a problem of 
competitive imbalance in the game. The "Blue Ribbon Panel" attempted to decide (1) 
whether the change in level of competitive balance is due to structural characteristics of 
1 The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball 
Economics. Pg 11 
1 
-baseball's economic system or due to other, less permanent forces which are likely to 
change over time; and (2) whether a lack of competitive balance has an adverse impact 
on the ability of clubs to grow the game, secure new facilities, and produce operating 
stabili ty. 2 
In this thesis, I am going to analyze how the economic factors of baseball have 
contributed to the competitive imbalance in baseball since 1994. In addition, I will use 
the compilation of data to make conjectures on the state of baseball and the direction I 
feel that Major League Baseball needs to go in order to reestablish itself as the "national 
pastime. The thesis will be divided into 3 main categories: a brief history of economic 
happenings that have effected the shaping of Major League Baseball, an accumulation of 
factors contributing to baseball's decline since the strike of 1994, and a conjecture of 
baseball's direction in the future, using the Blue Ribbon Panel's suggestions of reform. 
Economic History of Major League Baseball 
In order to fully understand the problems of Major League Baseball, we must first 
take a look at the factors of the past that have led to baseball's current condition. 
Baseball has been a sport around for over one hundred years and has undergone many 
economic changes that have molded the economics of present day Major League 
Baseball. Baseball has been changing ever since it began. 
For many years leading up to the 1900's, the owner's of teams in the National 
League controlled all aspects of baseball. They controlled who played where, who was 
allowed to enter the league, and every other factor regarding the business of baseball. In 
2 Blue Ribbon Panel, Pg. 53 
2 
1899, a man named Ban Johnson formed the American League. Johnson operated the 
Western League and carefully gathered economic backing to make a large change. 
Johnson announced his creation of the American League. The American League arose 
from the dissatisfaction of major-league caliber cities, owners, and players who were 
denied entry into the National League or oppressed by its collusive and authoritarian 
practices.3 The American League began raiding National League rosters for players, a 
predecessor to modern day free agency. Following much litigation, both leagues decided 
to respect each other's contracts and created a National Commission to govern both 
leagues. At this point, the players were represented by the Player's Protective 
Association, a labor union. The players were compensated well and labor troubles were 
non-existent. 
-
In the decade of the 1910's, new, urban, concrete enclosed ballparks emerged, 
creating new revenue for the owner's. In 1912, a minor strike occurred, the first in 
baseball. The players wanted small increases in player's salaries for lower paid players 
and improved conditions for minor leaguers. In 1914 and 1915, a competitive league 
established itself called the Federal League. At this point in time, players were under 
what was known as the reserve clause. The players were reserved to a team for their 
lifetime. They didn't have the right to offer their services to somebody else, either if they 
wanted to move or were hoping to get the benefits of a free labor market and have a 
competitive bidding process for their salaries. Players couldn't do that, everybody was 
under reserve.4 The Federal League came along and started offering the players a little 
more money. Major League Baseball didn't like the competition around salaries, so they 
3 100 Years of Major League Baseball, Pg. 10. 
4 The Economics of Baseball. Zimbalist. Pg 1-2. 
3 
made a deal with the owner's in the Federal League to incorporate some of the teams into 
Major League Baseball or they just bought them out. The owners tried to buyout the 
Baltimore Terrapins for $50,000. The Terrapins took major league baseball to court 
saying they were restraining trade, an anti-trust suit. The courts ruled in favor of the 
Terrapins but the ruling was appealed and overruled. The case eventually went to the 
Supreme Court where the courts ruled that the anti-trust laws did not cover baseball 
because baseball did not engage in interstate commerce.5 In 1919, one of the biggest 
scandals baseball has ever seen broke, the Black Sox Scandal. The Chicago White Sox 
of 1919 intentionally lost the World Series because they had betted on their own games. 
This was a direct relation to their owner, Charles Comiskey. They resented Comiskey, 
and were notoriously poorly paid by him, as he ran one of the most profitable franchises 
in baseball.6 This event was one of the first feuds between the players and the owners 
regarding labor relations. 
In 1920, the Boston Red Sox sold Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees for 
$125,000. Ruth's salary was then doubled to $20,000. This was the beginning of 
player's salaries on the rise. In addition, the New York Yankees had the game's highest 
payroll. His payroll was nearly $400,000 that was 4 times larger than St. Louis, which 
was one of the smallest cities in the league. This is eerily similar to the state of the 
Yankees payroll today compared to that of the Montreal Expos. By the end of the 
1920' s, Major League Baseball gate receipts reached $17 million and Babe Ruth pulled 
down $70,000 and the average player salary was $7,000. 
5 The Economics of Baseball, Zimbalist Pg. 2. 
6 100 Years of Baseball, Pg. 48. 
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Then came the Great Depression and the gate receipts plummeted from $17 
million to $10.8 million. At the same time, average player salaries sank to $4500 from 
the pre-Depression high of $7000.7 Attendance decreased because of the Depression. In 
1935, the Cincinnati Reds became the first team to install lights. This was a significant 
point in baseball because it gave people who worked during the day the opportunity to 
watch baseball. This led to an increase in attendance. Major League Baseball then 
discovered that radio was an important revenue source. In 1933, a radio company paid 
for exclusive rights to air the World Series, and by 1936 those rights cost $100,000.8 The 
lowly Boston Braves were the first team to command a fee for local rights to broadcast 
their games and in 1933 the club received $5000.9 This is the birth of a major 
contribution to what is now known as local revenue. By the decade's end, both the 
Yankees and the Giants took in over $100,000 a year in local broadcast rights fees. 1o 
In the 1940's a major boom hit Major League Baseball, the selling of television 
rights for baseball games. In 1948 the Boston Braves sold the television rights of their 
home games for the next two years and the coverage of most of their home games 
through the 1952 season, all for the sum of $40,000. Once again, the Braves were the 
first team to receive television rights, an entity that is key to today's local revenue. In 
1947, NBC began televising major league games attracting a whole new audience to the 
ballparks. People who had only casually followed baseball began going to games and 
7100 Years of Baseball. Pg. 130. 
g Ibid, Pg. 134. 
9 Ibid, Pg 134. 
10 Ibid Pg. 134 
5 
-enjoying themselves. The result was that in 1948, major league attendance reached a 
record high of 21 million. ll 
By the 1950's television was an immediate source of new revenue, but it also 
killed attendance. Though nobody wanted to admit it, baseball was in big trouble. 
Television was supposed to create vast new crowds, but instead it had the same effect on 
baseball as it did on boxing: fewer people turned out to see a show they could get for free 
at homeY In addition, the ballparks built in the 1910's were beginning to crumble and 
renovation in declining areas was not a good investment for the owners. 
Baseball finally expanded in the 1960's. Each league added 4 teams and 
increased the schedule to 162 games. These changes led to a wider audience for baseball 
and for the network and local television covered it, and revenues for most franchises 
increased appreciably.13 For example, local television brought the 16 major league clubs 
to a total net income of $2.3 million in 1950, and by 1969, big league baseball had grown 
to 24 teams and the net local TV revenues had leaped to $20.7 million.14 In 1966, a 
decision was made that would change baseball forever. The players hired Marvin Miller 
to become the full-time executive director of the Major League Baseball Players 
Association. (MLBP A) Miller had worked for the United States Steel Workers of 
America. He proved himself to be a labor genius when he negotiated an agreement 
between the owners and the players. His key victories were getting the owners to agree 
to contribute $4.5 million a year to the player pension fund and to increase the minimum 
11100 Years of Baseball, Pg. 186. 
12 Ibid, Pg. 238. 
13 Ibid, Pg. 292. 
14 Ibid, Pg. 292. 
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salary.15 The minimum salary had long been between $7000 and $10000 but Miller's 
negotiations raised the minimum player salary to $13500. Miller also got the owners to 
permit players to be represented in contract talks by agents, who would push player 
salaries much higher in the coming years. Another key concession in this agreement was 
the introduction of outside arbitrators to settle salary disputes between players and 
owners.16 It seems unbelievable the average salary of a major league player in 1964 was 
reportedly $14800 and in 1967 was only $21,000. In 1966, there were only four players 
who earned $100,000 salaries.17 These accomplishments were only the forerunners to 
Marvin Miller's greatest success. 
By 1978, players drew salaries that averaged more than $100,000. People 
compared them to Broadway entertainers, and the public's appreciation showed in better 
attendance at games and even higher television ratings, which produced additional 
revenue that the Players Association demanded and received after the strike of 1972. 18 
The 1970's were marred by intense legal battles in which the players fought for freedom 
from the reserve clause. Spearheaded by Miller, the Major League Baseball Players 
Association grew from a passive organization into an effective, powerful tool that earned 
the player's increased average salaries and the right to arbitration to settle disputes 
between players and owners. 19 In 1970, Curt Flood was traded from the St. Louis 
Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood filed suit against baseball's "reserve 
clause". He insisted that he should have the right to sign with the team of his choice. He 
sat out the entire season paving the way for several significant cases that followed. In 
15 100 Years of Baseball, Pg. 297. 
16 Ibid, Pg. 297. 
11 Ibid, Pg. 297. 
18 Ibid, Pg. 350. 
19 Ibid, Pg. 353. 
7 
-1972, Miller organized a player's strike that wiped out all of spring training as well as 
some early games. The players got, after four years of service, a monthly pension check 
starting at age 50.20 After this, the owners traded 16 of the player representatives of the 
union and intimidated even more into resigning. In 1973, the Player's Association was 
able to strike some deals in which they got arbitration if the player and the owner could 
not settle a salary dispute as well as the "10 and five" rule, which stated that a player with 
ten years of major league service and his last five with the same team, could veto a trade 
involving him.21 In 1975, Andy Messersmith decided to play the season without signing 
a contract, declaring himself as a "free agent." The owners got upset and sent the case to 
an arbitrator who ruled that a player's contract cannot be renewed indefinitely by the 
original owner until the player is traded, sold, released, or retired.22 The owners fired the 
arbitrator but the courts upheld the decision. Messersmith signed for $1 million dollars 
for 3 years. Thus, the creation of modern free agency. In 1976, the first free agent draft 
occurred and 24 players had won a total of $25 million in contracts. As a result, 
attendance and television ratings went sky-high. 
In 1981, a players strike occurred resulting in the cancellation of 713 games and 
an estimated $146 million loss in player salaries, ticket sales, broadcast revenues, and 
concession revenues.23 The strike was called by the players but many people blamed the 
owners. In 1988, the major league minimum was $62,000 and the average player salary 
was $449,862. Some justification for the players salaries came about in 1983, when NBC 
and ABC television networks signed a deal that guaranteed the teams $1.1 billion over 
2°100 Years Of Baseball, pg 354. 
2lIbid, Pg 355. 
22 Ibid, Pg 356. 
23 Ibid, Pg 400 
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-six years, which amounted to $6 million per team each season even if no fans showed 
Up.24 The contract signed in 1989 with CBS was worth $1.1 billion for four years and 
ESPN paid another $400 million for a three-year deal. At this point, the New York 
Yankees signed a local cable deal worth $500 million in 1988. The 1980's caused 
significant jumps in local revenues for teams as well as contributions to the entire league. 
Franchise values began to soar with the New York Mets selling for $40 million and the 
Atlanta Braves selling for $80 million. Baseball was at probably its highest point on a 
financial scale. The Basic Agreement between the owners and the players ended in 1989, 
causing fierce negotiations and planting the seeds for the strike of 1994. 
In 1990, the ending of the Basic Agreement took effect. The owners, claiming 
that salaries were going to rise 20 percent, wanted to initiate a salary cap. The players, 
fearing the cap would restrict the number of free agents, disagreed with the owner's 
proposal. After fierce negotiations, neither side could agree so the 1990 baseball season 
began with an owner's lockout. This began the downward spiral of baseball as our 
"national pastime." A new basic agreement was reached raising the minimum player 
salary from $68,000 to $100,000 and a six-man study committee on revenue sharing was 
formed. 25 The attendance at major league games was dwindling. New television 
contracts were being organized. In a deal, instead of rights fees, Major League Baseball 
would receive 87.5% of all net revenues up to $160 million. In addition, Major League 
Baseball signed a 6-year, $255 million deal with ESPN to televise 3 games per week. 26 
Despite the new contracts, baseball hit rock bottom in 1994. The owners made a 
proposal to the players that would guarantee $1 billion in salary and benefits but would 
24100 Years of Baseball. pg 403 
25 Ibid. pg 457 
26 Ibid. pg 458 
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-eliminate arbitration. Owner's claimed the proposal would raise average salaries from 
$1.2 million in 1994 to $2.6 million by 2001.27 The players union did not accept the offer 
and on August 12, 1994 the players decided to strike canceling the rest of the season, 
resulting in the first year since its inception the World Series would not be played. All in 
all, 669 games were eventually wiped out. The owners ended up losing $800 million in 
revenue and the players lost $350 million in salaries. The strike caused Major League 
Baseball to lose many fans. Major League Baseball would never be the same and 
changes needed to be made. The home run race in 1998 between Sammy Sosa and Mark 
McGwire brought some fans back to the game, but the problems of baseball were never 
solved. A lack of competitiveness emerged as a result of new agreements and baseball 
has never fully recovered. It is important for us to look at the economics of baseball 
since 1994 in order to understand why baseball has never recovered. 
The Current State of Baseball Since the Players Strike of 1994 
Since 1994, baseball has undergone some changes to try and remedy the situation 
caused by the baseball strike of 1994. In actuality, no changes made in baseball have 
allowed them to make up for this mistake, rather baseball has become an organization 
lacking in competition. This lack of competition is related to many factors, market size, 
payroll, local revenues, new stadiums, etc. In order to attempt to remedy the situation, 
we must first understand why baseball is lacking competition. 
27 100 Years of Baseball, pg 458 
10 
Competitive Balance 
Competitive balance is a key issue that does not exist in Major League Baseball. 
This is directly due to the state of the economics of the game. Competitive balance is 
defined as: a well managed club that demonstrates baseball acumen should allow its fans 
a reasonable hope that their club will be able to play and win in the post-season?8 The 
Blue Ribbon Report assumes that a reasonable degree of competitive balance is an 
essential foundation for the continued popularity and growth of the game, and that 
mechanisms must be in place to ensure long-term competitive balance despite the 
inevitable inequalities in size, local market conditions, and demographics of the 
communities in which Major League Baseball franchises are located.29 A competitive 
balance is crucial for the survival of the game of baseball on a professional level. One of 
baseball's oldest and cherished notions is that hope springs eternal and that every club is 
a contender, at least in spring training.3o What has made baseball's recent seasons 
disturbing, and what makes its current economic structure untenable in the long run, is 
that year after year, too many clubs know in spring training that they have no realistic 
prospect of reaching postseason play. Too many clubs in low-revenue markets can only 
expect to compete for postseason berths if ownership is willing to incur staggering 
operating losses to subsidize a competitive player payroll?! Competitive balance means 
a reasonably level playing field. Competitive balance is a desirable condition, and 
regardless of whether it has always existed of ever existed in baseball history, it doesn't 
28 Blue Ribbon Panel. pg 13 
29 Ibid. pg 13 
30 Ibid. pg 13 
31 Ibid. pg 5 
11 
-mean it isn't worth striving toward.32 Economic factors in Major League Baseball are the 
cause of the lack of competition in baseball, some are more important than others. 
Baseball's Anti-trust Exemption 
In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Major League Baseball 
was not covered by the anti-trust laws because baseball did not engage in interstate 
commerce. That Supreme Court decision is still in effect today. The exemption is 
founded on the notion that it is in the public's best interest to have Major League 
Baseball as a national enterprise with orderly operations and a reasonable degree of 
cooperation among the clubs, even if that cooperation is not strictly in compliance with 
the pro-competitive policies that underlie the anti-trust laws.33 These rules are intended 
to protect the public interest by enabling franchises in communities of varying sizes and 
with different market conditions to compete against each other with a reasonable 
opportunity to succeed.34 So baseball thus is in a unique position that none of the other 
sports leagues are in and certainly no other industry, manufacturing, service or otherwise 
is in. It's a self-regulating monopoly. There are no federal or state bodies that regulate 
what baseball owners can do?5 The one difference in this monopoly is that the team does 
not flourish if it knocks its opponent out of the industry. The teams have to behave like a 
cartel. Like other cartels, it is threatened by the self-interested and sometimes group 
destructive behavior of its members.36 I find that a monopoly doesn't fit Major League 
Baseball because each entity has the ability to create their own prices, which creates 
32 Economics of Baseball, Costas, pg 2 
33 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 37 
34 Ibid, pg 5 
35 Economics of Baseball, Zimbalist, pg 2 
36 Ibid, pg 3 
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competition. In addition, since there is no forcing out of competition a monopoly would 
not apply. I feel that baseball is more like an oligopoly. Each baseball team has a clearly 
homogenous product, baseball. The most striking characteristic of oligopoly is the 
interdependence that exists among the firms in the industry. Since there are only a few 
firms in the industry, the pricing, advertising, and other promotional behavior of each 
firm greatly affect the other firms in the industry and evoke imitation and retaliation.3? A 
baseball team cannot exist without the presence of others because the team needs 
someone to play against. The teams end up competing in salaries, advertising, and local 
revenue increases. No matter what you define baseball as, whether it is a monopoly, 
oligopoly, or cartel they are still exempt from anti-trust laws. With its antitrust 
exemption, baseball operates as one entity with 30 different branches. This allows Major 
League Baseball the power to move teams, contract teams, and do whatever they want 
without breaking any laws. Baseball holds a power that no other business, no other 
industry in the country has. Major League Baseball needs to reexamine the anti-trust 
exemption and its economic policies to put itself back in the spotlight as our "national 
pastime." 
Industry Revenue 
Industry revenues are derived from local revenues, Central Fund Revenues, and 
Revenue Sharing. In the past five years the industry revenues have doubled. The 
industry revenue grew from $1,384,985,100 to $2,786,874,001 from the years 1995-
1999?8 The average revenue of clubs in 1999 approached $100 million. Between 1995 
37 Bergen, Economics Of Baseball, pg 2 
38 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 15 
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and 1999, the top quarter of baseball teams increased their total revenue by an average of 
$55 million while the total revenue for clubs in the bottom quarter of baseball have rose 
by an average of $32 million.39 Also between 1995 and 1999, the difference in total 
revenue between the average club in the top quarter and the average club in the bottom 
quarter increased from $48 million to $71 million.4o Between 1995 and 1999, the 
difference between the highest and lowest club's total revenue rose from $74 million to 
$129 million.4lIn 1999, the sum of the revenues of the top three revenue clubs exceeded 
the combined revenue of all the clubs in the bottom quarter by $33 million.42 In 1999, 
the average total revenue of the top quarter of Major League Baseball teams was 32 
percent higher than the 2nd quarter, 73 percent larger than the third quarter, and 118% 
larger than the bottom quarter clubs.43 It is plain to see that revenues of clubs are 
growing by leaps and bounds, especially those in the upper quarter of Major League 
Baseball. It seems that the rich keep getting richer, thus creating an even bigger disparity 
and an even larger competitive imbalance. Much of that is attributed to revenue, 
especially local revenue. 
Local Revenues 
Local revenues consists of gate receipts, television, radio, and cable fees, ballpark 
concessions, advertising and publications, parking, suite rentals, postseason, spring 
training, and other baseball revenues.44 Local revenues are the largest component of 
39 Blue Ribbon Report, Pg 2 
40 Ibid, pg 2 
41 Ibid, pg 3 
42 Ibid, pg 3 
43 Ibid, pg 2 
44 Ibid, pg 59 
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most clubs annual revenues. The ratio between the highest and lowest club's local 
revenues has more than doubled in just five years from, 5.5:1 in 1995 to 14.7:1 in 1999. 
The average ratio between the three clubs with the highest local revenue and the three 
with the lowest local revenue has risen from 4.1: 1 to 7: 1. 45 Local revenues are the single 
largest contributor to the baseball's lack of competitive balance. Local revenue is also 
the single fastest growing component of industry revenues.46 From 1995 to 1999 local 
revenues for Major League Baseball grew from $1,174,962,112 to $2,197,319,000. This 
is an increase of 87%, adding over $1 billion to local revenues. From 1996 through 1999, 
local revenue constituted approximately 79% of total industry revenue.47 In 1999, the 
New York Yankees pulled in $176 million while the Montreal Expos grossed $12 million 
in local revenues. This simply shows that it is impossible for a team like Montreal to 
compete with a team that has over ten times as much money coming in. 
Gate Receipts 
Gate receipts are only one of the factors making up local revenue. In 2001, The 
New York Yankees took in $98 million in regular season gate receipts while Montreal 
took in only $6,405,000. This difference, while seemingly disparaging, should be 
compared differently. The comparison of profit should be calculated by using attendance 
and average ticket price. Attendance can be misleading because of the size of the 
ballparks. Average ticket price is calculated on the unrealistic assumption that the team 
sells every available ticket at its face value.48 The New York Yankees average ticket 
price was $28.90 compared to that of the Montreal Expos who's was $9.70. In terms of 
45 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 2 
46 Ibid, pg 17 
47 Ibid, pg 17 
48 The Numbers (part one), Pappas, pg 1 
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profit per ticket, the Yankees made $1.12 while the Expos made $0.26. Profit per ticket 
represents the amount of money each ticket made when expenses were subtracted from 
revenues. This statistic is still a great difference in revenues especially when the 
difference in attendance was over 1.8 million fans. This simply proves that gate receipts 
make up a big amount of local revenue, and that the product, the price, and the attendance 
playa crucial role in the revenue from the gates. 
Local Media Revenues 
The size of the market that a baseball club is in is directly proportional to the 
amount of local revenue accumulated. Local media revenues are derived from local 
television, radio, and cable contracts. Once again, the New York Yankees took in over 
$56 million in local media revenues, partly because they are in the single largest media 
market in the United States. In addition, the New York Mets were second, with just over 
$46 million. The interesting thing is that the local media revenue in two team cities 
divides the revenue equally between the clubs. The difference in the Yankees and Mets 
revenues lies in the fact the New York Mets are in the midst of a 30 year cable contract 
which does not generate as much money as the Yankees. Another advantage in local 
media revenues are those teams that have their own cable based media deals, such as the 
Atlanta Braves, Chicago Cubs, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. In these cases, more 
games aired equal more local revenue dollars. The Boston Red Sox also have their own 
network contract with NESN. It is no wonder that the clubs with their own deals all rank 
in the top eight in local media revenues. It is not always the money that drives teams to 
own their own media entity. In particular, an entity that owns both a baseball team and a 
media outlet may well charge the TV station less than fair market value for the club's 
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media rights. This strategy not only allows the club to cry poverty during baseball labor 
talks, but artificially inflates the stations profits.49 Media market rank also affects local 
revenues available to clubs, including amount they can charge for ballpark naming rights, 
signage, sponsorships, etc. 50 
Postseason games 
Another type of local revenue is derived if a team makes it to postseason play. 
The New York Yankees made $16 million on postseason revenue in 2001 while the New 
York Mets lost $154,000 and the Chicago Cubs lost $17,000. The losses reported by the 
Cubs and Mets probably relate to the cost of selling tickets to games that were never 
played but: clubs already impose a nonrefundable service charge to cover such costs, they 
earn interest on ticket money before it's refunded or applied to 2002 season tickets, and 
other clubs in the same position report no losses.51 When the teams that have the most 
money continually make the playoffs, they receive more, thus creating an even larger 
disparity for the next season. 
Other Local Operating Revenue 
This catch all category includes concessions, parking, stadium advertising, and 
especially luxury boxes and club seats.52 In this category, the San Francisco Giants lead 
the way with over $61 million in revenue. Every team in the top half (15 teams) either 
owns its park, plays in a stadium less than ten years old, or plays in New York.53 This 
data shows explicitly why it is important to teams to have new, modern stadiums or play 
in large media markets. 
49 The Numbers (part two), Pappas, pg 2 
50 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 19 
51 The Numbers (part three), Pappas, pg 1 
52 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 2 
53 Ibid, pg 2-3 
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It is absolutely imperative that if a team wants to compete, they must pull in 
ample amounts of local revenue. From 1995 to 1999, the top quarter of Major League 
Baseball teams have increased their local revenue by $53.5 million while the clubs in the 
bottom quarter of Major League Baseball have increased local revenue by onl y $7.9 
million.54 In 1999, one club's local revenues exceeded by approximately $11 million the 
combined local revenues of six other clubs.55 It is obvious that local revenues create such 
a disparity between clubs in total revenue and this is clearly a factor in the lack of 
competitive balance in Major League Baseball. The heart of baseball's problem of 
competitive balance is local revenue. 56 
Central Fund Revenues 
Central revenue funds are funds that have been traditionally distributed evenly 
over all of the clubs. Central revenue funds are generated by industry wide contracts 
such as national television contracts and licensing arrangements.57 From 1995 to 1999, 
the average net central fund distribution rose from $4, 774,951 to $13,315,000.58 The 
central fund revenues are important to many low-revenue teams because this is extra 
revenue that they need to compete. The only problem is, that in the last five years, while 
the central fund revenues have risen, they have not risen as fast as local revenues. 
Although this central fund is a way to help all teams, it is having less of an impact than its 
intended purpose. The lowest revenue clubs, however, find that their central fund 
54 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 19 
55 Ibid, Pg 2 
56 Ibid, pg 6 
57 Ibid, pg 15 
58 Ibid, pg 21 
18 
distribution is now larger than their local revenues.59 Eventually, Major League Baseball 
granted the commissioner the opportunity to grant the Central Funds Revenue unevenly 
over the teams, thus providing more money for the low-revenue teams. This process 
includes taking money from the high-revenue clubs and redistributing it to the low-
revenue clubs. Over the four-year period of 1995 to 1999, the higher revenue clubs have 
redistributed a total of $312 million to lower revenue clubs.6o While this redistribution is 
trying to help alleviate the burden on lower revenue clubs, the difference cannot be made 
up due to the high amounts of local revenue some clubs are bringing in. In order to help 
remedy this problem, perhaps a redistribution of local revenues would help balance the 
revenue situation in Major League Baseball. 
Revenue Sharing 
Revenue sharing transfers locally generated money from high revenue clubs to 
low revenue clubs in order to help balance the disparity between revenues. The 
collective bargaining agreement between the players and the owners in 1996 replaced the 
old revenue sharing plan with a new, more complicated plan. Prior to 1996, gate receipts 
were shared between clubs. Gate revenue from American League games was split 80/20 
between home and visiting teams where as in the National League, the visiting team 
received roughly $0.56 of every ticket sold.61 In the bargaining agreement, the 
combination of the "straight pool" plan and the "split pool plan" were initiated. The 
straight pool plan calls for each club to contribute 39% of its net local revenue (defined as 
local revenue minus stadium operating expenses) into a pool. The pool is then divided 
5~lue Ribbon Report, Blue Ribbon Report, pg 21 
6OIbid, pg 21 
61 Fizel, Sports Economics, pg 195 
19 
-evenly among all clubs. In contrast, the split pool plan requires each club to contribute 
20% of its local revenue into a pool. Seventy-five percent of that money is divided 
evenly among the clubs and the remaining 25% is divided as additional subsidies to the 
seven clubs with the lowest net local revenue.62 These plans phased out the old revenue 
sharing plan and in 2000 the split pool plan became permanent. It has since expired with 
the ending of the collective bargaining agreement. The limited revenue sharing enacted 
in recent years has failed to promote competitive balance, as intended.63 In fact, a 
number of low revenue clubs, realizing that they had no realistic chance to compete for 
the postseason, opted instead for marginal profitability from revenue sharing proceeds 
and did not increase their payrolls.64 It is this misuse of revenue sharing that is not 
allowing its original purpose to take place. Revenue sharing needs some serious 
revisions in order to work. Revenue sharing is a great way to help increase competitive 
balance but not at the current rates that have been adopted by Major League Baseball. 
The concept of revenue sharing does not exist other than in the sports world. In fact, the 
very suggestion that competitors be compelled to share revenue is repugnant to the anti-
trust laws that are the basis of our competitive society.65 Revenue sharing has evolved 
from the National League's nineteen cents a head through the turnstiles to today's 
system. The growth of unshared local revenues has grown faster than shared national 
revenue.66 Due to the fact that all Major League Baseball teams are the "branches" of 
one single entity, and all money is created by one product, baseball, then the revenues 
should be split fairly between all clubs. It is the activity of the league as a whole that 
62 Fizel, Sports Economics, pg 196 
63 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 8 
64 Ibid, pg 11 
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-confers value on the activities of each participating team.67 Revenue sharing is a crucial 
part of the ability of the game to survive as well as the teams to compete. More money 
needs to be distributed to increase competition. A perfect example is the National 
Football League. The NFL adopted a revenue sharing plan that nearly splits all team 
revenues across the board. The result, a competitive balance that results in an equal 
opportunity for each team to compete and succeed, year in and year out. To win a 
championship in the NFL you need good team chemistry, good players, a motivational 
coach, and a the ability to work within the salary cap, where as in Major League Baseball 
all you need is the fattest wallet. Revenue sharing is often defended as necessary to give 
"small market-teams a chance to compete." Measured against that standard, Major 
League Baseball's revenue-sharing plan contains two serious flaws. First, it doesn't 
require recipients to try to compete: owners can simply pocket the money, treating it as a 
no-obligation subsidy. The second problem results from a definitional ambiguity. Small 
market team can mean either "low revenue team" or "team that plays in a small 
metropolitan area." Since a team's revenues are largely dependent on its marketing and 
on field performance, the second definition is the more meaningful, but Major League 
Baseball's revenue sharing formula uses the first definition exclusively.68 Revenue 
sharing is crucial for teams to survive and an increase from the current 20% schedule 
now is a must. Let us settle on middle ground and say that the product and all its values 
are jointly created. The need for the nearly equal distribution of those players between 
the two teams is the basic reason for increased revenue sharing, because the imbalanced 
67 Griffith, Economics of Baseball, pg 2 
68 The Numbers (part six), Pappas, pg 2-3 
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system that exists today has damaged that element of each game's value. Therefore, all 
teams have a nearly equal claim to the revenue.69 
Stadiums 
New stadiums are an integral part in increasing revenues for teams. Each new 
stadium provides the team that plays there a significant amount of increased revenue in 
the form of luxury boxes, naming rights, etc. but a lot of times at the cost of debt 
financing. The new generation of ballparks that began with the 1992 opening of Oriole 
Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore includes design and programming features and 
modem amenities that have proved to be enormously popular with the public. These 
ballparks have dramatically increased the attendance and revenues of the clubs that play 
in them.7o New ballpark construction and renovation has made a significant contribution 
to revenue growth in the second half of the past decade. In fact, the construction and 
renovation of facilities to add modem amenities has been effective, in increasing the 
revenue, and therefore the player payroll and competitiveness of some clubs.7 ! New 
ballparks stimulate the revenue of clubs by offering the fans something besides a baseball 
game. When fans go to the game they are now entertained. It is complete baseball 
experience. The ballparks themselves have become attractions, dramatically increasing 
attendance and revenues and providing the club the financial resources to field teams 
with payrolls high enough to have a chance to be competitive.72 The building of new 
stadiums allows the small-market teams the opportunity to compete with the large market 
69 Griffith, Economics of Baseball, pg 3 
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-teams, but only for a few years. Soon, all other teams will catch up, the stadium will 
become old news because someone built one bigger and better, and baseball will be back 
to the small-market versus large-market local revenue battle. Baseball teams in large 
markets will get new stadiums too and then they will have more revenue than they 
currently have. For example, the proposed stadium building for the New York Yankees 
could potentially give the Yankees and increased revenue of $80 million per year. 
Financing stadiums are one of the key aspects in determining the effect on revenues. The 
level of public investment in new ballparks also varies dramatically from community to 
community, which means that some clubs need to devote much of their newly generated 
revenue to private financing and debt service to others.73 In the 1970's there was a 
boom of multi-purpose stadiums (used for both baseball and football). Now there is a 
movement to create sport specific ballparks because of the increased revenue potential. 
There is a need to eliminate those factors that could prevent teams from being 
consistently competitive in the future. In particular, it's important that the ball club be 
able to realize the full revenue potential that each marketplace represents. A fan-friendly, 
baseball only facility is necessary to achieve that goal.74 A properly designed facility, a 
baseball only facility, will put the club in a position to address the needs of the fans, not 
just the corporate fans, not just the individual fans, but special segments of the fans. 75 
Any more, it is more crucial to be able to work with the public sector in order to finance 
new ballparks. Public financing helps divert some of the cost and will allow the teams to 
keep more revenue for themselves, thus making them more competitive in the league. It 
is reasonable to expect that new ballparks will continue to fuel industry revenue growth 
73 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 16 
74 Lamping, Economics of Baseball, pg 4 
75 Ibid, pg 4 
23 
-for the foreseeable future, and this is a positive trend for the industry.76 New ballparks 
are not only crucial for the revenue and success of the teams that inhabit them, but also 
for the game of baseball and the industry it represents. New ballparks are vitally 
important for expanding the game's prosperity. Baseball is best enjoyed in intimate, 
charming venues that become attractions themselves, regardless of whether the home 
team is winning or losing. However, they are not in and of themselves the answer to 
solving the competitive balance and economic problems that plague Major League 
Baseball.77 
Team Payroll 
Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between high payrolls and success 
on the field. Although a high payroll is not always sufficient to produce a club capable of 
reaching postseason play, a high payroll has become an increasingly necessary ingredient 
of on field success.78 From 1995 through 1999, every World Series winner was from the 
top quarter of Major League Baseball payroll. No club outside the top quarter even won 
a World Series game. Each winner was among the five largest payroll clubs.79 With the 
exception of 1998, even the loser of the World Series was from the top quarter of Major 
League Baseball payroll. In fact, no team in the bottom half of Major League Baseball 
payroll even won any of the 158-playoff games played between 1995 and 1999. These 
statistics are indicative of the need to have a high payroll to win a championship. 
Without a high payroll, a team cannot be competitive. The average club payroll rose 
76 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 16 
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from $33.12 million in 1995 to $49.67 million in 1999. That is an increase of 50 percent 
over a five year time period. The teams in the third quarter increased their payrolls by 
only 13% and the teams in the bottom quarter raised their payroll only 19%.80 This leads 
me to believe that teams knew that they did not have a legitimate chance at making the 
postseason due to lack of revenue, so they decided to increase their payroll as little as 
possible in order to maintain some degree of profitability. This poses a problem for low-
revenue clubs, they cannot compete and spend the money that high revenue clubs can. It 
is simple, the more revenues a team has the more successful they will be. Quite simply, 
the higher revenue clubs have the financial resources to: (1) sign high salaried free agents 
from other clubs; (2) retain their own high salaried players; and (3) sign top prospects 
from the rule 4 draft, where signing bonuses for highly sought after players have risen 
dramatically in recent years: and sign players from foreign countries, where players are 
exempt from the draft and can be signed as free agents. 81 Nowhere, was this more 
prominent than in the cases of Ichiro Suzuki in 2001 and Hideki Irabu in 1999. Both 
players were highly sought after players. In 2001, the Mariners paid over $10 million to 
buy the rights to sign Ichiro. The case was the same for Hideki Irabu and the New York 
Yankees. Both are clubs with high revenues, and both bought the opportunity to 
negotiate with these players. Because of the difference in payrolls, the rich clubs become 
richer in talent, stockpiling expensive players, while poor teams cannot afford to bid on 
premium players either at the entry level or on the veteran free agent market. 82 
Competition is related to player payroll but spending money on free agents by small 
market teams is not always a bad idea. Small market is often mistakenly used as a 
8<131ue Ribbon Report, pg 26 
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synonym for low revenue. A team's revenue, and the payroll it can support, is a function 
of the team's recent success than the size of its market.83 Player's salaries are 
investments. A team that spends its money wisely wins more games, and in any market, 
a winning team means higher attendance and more public interest, which ultimately 
translates to larger media contracts, and more money for the owner.84 While this all 
sounds good in theory, revenue controls payroll. Many owners are not willing to take the 
chance on million dollar free agents just hoping for a dream season. Financially, that 
would be a foolish move. Granted, in order to make money you have to spend money 
and spending money would help alleviate some of the competitive imbalance. From 
1995 to 1999, the average payroll for clubs in the top quarter of Major League Baseball 
increased $32 million (or 70 %), while the average payroll for clubs in the bottom quarter 
of baseball increased $2.4 million (or 13 %).85 This difference in spending has not been 
the norm for Major League Baseball. From 1982 to 1990, the average ratio of the highest 
payroll quartile to the lowest payroll quartile was 2: 1. In 1995, the ratio was 2.6: 1 and 
rose to 3.9:1 in 1999.86 According to this data I would conjecture that the strike season of 
1994 and the ensuing collective bargaining agreement cause an increase in revenues of 
large market teams, thus separating themselves from the small market teams in terms of 
payroll. This payroll disparity is a major economic factor in the imbalance of 
competition in Major League Baseball. This disparity is in stark contrast to the 
disparities of professional football and basketball. For example, in the NFL, the ratio of 
average payroll of the highest seven teams to the average payroll of the lowest seven 
83 The Numbers (part four), Pappas. pg 1 
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teams in 1999 was 1.4: 1. In the NBA, the ratio of the highest seven payroll teams to the 
lowest seven payroll teams was 1.7:1.87 
Thus it is plain to see the relationship that payroll has on competitive balance. The total 
number of games won is generally related to the payroll of that team. Now, this is not 
always the case because of circumstances like team chemistry and baseball management 
do make a difference. Occasionally, there will be a small market team that has many 
elements other than payroll and is able to compete on the field, but more often than not, 
payroll is the deciding factor in success. Put another way, a high payroll does not 
automatically guarantee a good win-loss record and a contending season, but a low 
payroll usually means that a club cannot contend for a postseason berth or 
championship.88 
Collective Bargaining Agreement of 1996 
After the strike of 1994, the owners and the players needed a contract to ease the 
tensions and restore baseball to its previous state. The result, the 1996 collective 
bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement was a contract between 
players and owners outlining terms of play. The agreement has since expired and a new 
one is in the works. There were many aspects that were included in the 1996 collective 
bargaining agreement. Some of the most important ones were: Interleague play and 
Expansion, Changes in the minimum salary, The luxury tax, Revenue sharing, Payroll 
tax, Salary Arbitration, the player's option in the year 2000, and service days. Each of 
these sections was included for the betterment of the game, but not all of these aspects 
87 Blue Ribbon Report. pg 29 
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followed their intended purpose. While collective bargaining was a step in the right 
direction, it didn't have the desired effect. In order to understand the collective 
bargaining agreement and the effect on baseball economics, we must look at the key 
features that were associated with it. 
Interleague Play and Expansion 
A major step for Major League Baseball was the initiation of interleague play. As 
part of the agreement, management was issued the option to extend interleague play if it 
were desirable. The result, interleague play still exists today. This is important 
economically, because it allowed teams to play that were in the same geographical area. 
For example, the New York Yankees and the New York Mets. It had been a very long 
time since these teams played each other and the excitement increased revenues for both 
teams. Similarly were the effects of the Cincinnati Reds and Cleveland Indians series as 
well as the games between the San Francisco Giants and the Oakland A's. In addition, 
the collective bargaining agreement allowed for the creation of four new franchises. In 
1998, the Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays became the newest 
Major League franchises. Two more franchises were pennitted provided that 
management gives notice to the players by the end of 1999.89 While a second expansion 
never took place, the Arizona Diamondbacks rose to the top to win the championship in 
2001, partly because of large amounts of revenue. 
Changes in the minimum salary 
As we have seen in the past, changes in the minimum salary grew very slowly. 
Through the 1960's the minimum salary was between $7000 and $10000, a far cry from 
the salary minimums today. With the advent of a strong player's union, the minimum 
89 Sport Economics, Fizel, pg 193 
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salary began to escalate culminating in the new requirements established by the collective 
bargaining agreement. Beginning in 1997, baseball's minimum salary rose from 
$109,000 to $150,000. The minimum rose to $170,000 in 1998, $200,000 in 1999 and 
$200,000 in 2000 and 2001.90 The minimum salary has come a long way since the mid-
1960's and has contributed to baseball's poor economic standing by inflating player 
salaries and causing a need for more revenue. 
Luxury Tax 
The luxury tax was baseball's idea of a salary cap. The main principle behind the 
idea is to charge the owner's a tax on their payroll if it exceeds a certain amount. One 
major problem with the luxury tax is the willingness of owners and players to evade the 
taxes by structuring of contracts. The Player's Association successfully bargained for the 
removal of the tax in the final two years of the collective bargaining agreement. For 
example, the owner may create long-term contracts that are really short-term contracts. If 
an owner wishes to up the ante on a player who has been offered a three-year, $15 million 
contract by another club, but stands to pay a tax if he does so, an attractive option is to 
lengthen the agreement. By signing the player to a four-year, $16 million contract, the 
average annual salary falls from $5.3 million to $4 million. Because the owner may have 
only been interested in the player's services over the first three seasons, the club may 
either retain the player for the fourth year or it may release him and pay the $4 million 
salary. Keeping in mind that the agreement calls for no tax in the final two years of the 
agreement, lengthening the contract is an attractive means to minimize the tax burden.91 
Luxury taxes were only applicable to those clubs whose payroll exceeded $51 million in 
90 Sport Economics, FizeI, pg 193 
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1997, $55 million in 1998, and $58.9 million in 1999. The penalties for exceeding the 
thresholds include a 35 percent tax on the excess in 1997 and 1998 and a 34 percent tax 
on the surplus payroll in 1999.92 The thresholds may be adjusted if more than five teams 
exceeded this maximum payroll but established that a maximum of five teams will be 
liable for tax payments in a given year. Once again, the luxury tax is in the process for 
the new collective bargaining agreement for the players and owners. The union officials 
did not accept the proposed luxury tax by the owners. The owners had wanted to have a 
50 percent tax on payrolls above $98 million but the union proposed using draft picks as 
a currency balance.93 In theory the lUxury tax seemed to be a good idea, but practically it 
failed. Many teams were able to spend more money than the lUxury tax maximum as 
long as they did not have one of the five highest payrolls in baseball. 
Revenue Sharing 
Revenue sharing was discussed previously. The collective bargaining agreement 
set forth the "straight pool plan" and the "split pool plan" which eventually phased into 
the "split pool plan" only. The "split pool plan" of revenue sharing seemed like a good 
plan but what happened was that teams that knew they would be unable to compete used 
cheaper players instead of quality players to offset their costs and receive the low-
revenue team subsidy. Because the subsidy targets low revenue clubs, the practice is 
encouraged. The result may be an increase in the number of mid-season cost-cutting 
trades as teams with losing records jockey to position themselves for post-season 
subsidies.94 
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-Payroll Tax 
The payroll tax was only in effect for the 1997 and 1998 seasons. The players 
agreed to pay a tax equal to 2.5 percent of the final actual payrolls for all clubs to the 
Industry Growth Fund.95 The Industry Growth Fund was established to promote the 
game of baseball through advertising, international development such as player tours and 
media relations, developing media technology, and community service activities. The 
IGF is jointly administered by the clubs and the Player's Association and was funded by 
lUXUry tax proceeds and the payroll tax proceeds.96 Unlike the lUXury tax, which applies 
to each team's forty-man roster, the payroll tax applies to players on the twenty-five-man 
major league roster. Further the tax is assessed only after deductions are made for the 
lower-paid players and it does not include player benefits.97 The payroll tax did not deter 
the players and the owners on negotiating any big time contracts but it did add money to 
the IGF to help promote the game of baseball. 
Salary Arbitration 
Salary arbitration has been available to the players since 1973. Salary arbitration 
is when a player and a team cannot agree on an amount of money to be paid to the player, 
a neutral third party researches the claims and makes a decision on the amount of money 
the player should receive. The arbitrator's verdict is final and no other negotiations may 
take place. Players between roughly three and six years of major league service may 
unilaterally opt to have their salaries determined by an independent arbitrator.98 
Traditionally, only one arbitrator has heard salary arbitration cases. Beginning with the 
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1998 season, baseball phased in a three-person arbitrator panel jointly selected by the 
management and Player's Association.99 The owners have always felt that salary 
arbitration has led to the escalation of player's salaries. Although changes were made to 
the panel size of the arbitrators, they still behaved and ruled much in the same manner as 
when there was only one arbitrator. 
The Player's Option in the Year 2000 
The player's option in the year 2000 was an option to extend the collective 
bargaining agreement through the 2001 season. The 1996 collective bargaining 
agreement officially expired on October 31, 2000. The players ended up extending the 
agreement and avoided a lock out or strike. The player's option stated that if the players 
opted to extend the agreement, they must pay the clubs a total of $2 million. It was a 
very interesting thing that the player's extended the contract because if the players did not 
exercise the option, they would have not had to pay the $2 million payment to the clubs, 
and they would also have received a strike fund collected by the management. loo 
Service Days 
One aspect that caused a roadblock in the collective bargaining agreement was the 
issue of service days. A player is credited with one service day for each day spent on a 
major league roster. Service days are used to determine arbitration eligibility, free agent 
eligibility, and retirement pensions. IOI Service days were not credited during the 1994-95 
strike and many players stood to lose a lot of money. The owners used this as a powerful 
bargaining tool. This loss of service days added to lost income and many players were 
going to lose more money than they would receive from the bargaining table. However, 
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-in the final agreement, the owners agreed to restore the player's lost service days on the 
condition that the Player's Association drop its unfair labor practices charges against 
management. 102 
Free Agency 
Free agency was established in the 1970's as a way for players to obtain a 
competitive salary in an open market. It is a simple notion. Players should have the 
ability to offer their services to whoever is willing to pay top dollar. It is simple good 
business and a part of our free market society. Free agency connotes the ability to make a 
decision as to where you want to work, taking into account factors of a job, weighing 
them however you think are most appropriate, and making a decision as to where you 
want to go. 103 Free agency tends to lift players salaries up to market value. That is what 
is expected to happen, getting paid fair market value for services rendered. Free agency 
promotes a higher quality product in the long run. Higher salaries lead to more people 
preparing themselves in baseball skills with a desire to play Major League Baseball, and 
it yields a better quality player. 104 Since the inception of free agency, competitive 
balance in Major League Baseball has been very good, factoring out the last 5 years. 
Free agency makes it harder to hold onto a winning team, or more expensive to hold onto 
a winning team and so it's harder to hold winning teams together. Free agency also 
makes it easier for teams on the bottom to rebuild more rapidly. lOS The typical owner 
tries to assemble a team out of units of talent that will just barely win the division. As 
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salaries go up, as free agency has brought salaries up to their free market level, units of 
talent become more expensive, and hence it becomes even more important that owners 
win by the narrowest of margins. 106 This idea shows why teams were so close and 
competitive in the 1970's, 1980's and the early 1990's. At some point though, free 
agency got so out of control that competition was lost and the team that had the most 
money was able to have the most stars. The emphasis was not on having a competing 
team that won by the slimmest of margins that promoted balance, the emphasis moved to 
the more revenue a team can produce will equal into the more championships won, thus 
creating a dynasty and lack of competitive balance. Free agency is necessary for the 
survival of baseball. It is only fair that players be allowed to seek their market value and 
be able to choose who and where they want to play. Professional sports have always 
been different than any other industry. In any other business except for professional 
sports the notice that you could involuntarily transfer a person between employers would 
be taken as one of the most bizarre notions imaginable. Marvin Miller used to describe it 
to players by saying something like 'what would happen if General Motors announced 
that it had traded two engineers for a draftsmen and a software technician, to Ford?' 107 It 
is true that baseball is different from any other business, but the fundamental principals of 
a free market should still exist. The ability of the players to seek fair market value for 
their services is as essential to them as the owner's ability to sell their television rights to 
a local cable agent. 
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-Salary Cap 
The salary cap is a maximum amount of money that a team can spend on its 
payroll. The National Football League and the National Basketball Association both 
have salary caps and both have competitive balance. Major League Baseball does not 
have a salary cap, and thus has no competitive balance. Although this notion seems to be 
an exact measurement of competitive balance, it is only one contributing factor. Baseball 
has a rule that is called the 60/40 rule. This rule states that a team cannot have debt 
higher than 40 percent of their asset value. This rule has recently surfaced after laying 
dormant for many years. The rule affects two primary categories of teams: those with 
long term contracts and teams that have helped finance their own ballparks. 108 Also, 
three types of teams will be found not in compliance: teams with big salary deferrals such 
as the Diamondbacks, teams with really low revenues, and teams with large payrolls due 
to heavy long-term contracts. 109 This is simply an attempt to lower labor costs (player 
salaries), exactly what a salary cap does. If a team is found in violation, they will be 
unable to take on any more "liabilities", also known as long term contracts. 110 The rule 
was never intended to be a kind of salary cap. It was simply put into effect to identify 
teams running up enormous debt before they got to far out on the limb of credit risk. lll 
In the mid 1980's a grievance was filed and an arbitrator ruled that the 60/40 rule was 
legal, as long as it had nothing to do with player compensation. Clearly, this new 
enforcement of the 60/40 rule does have to do with player compensation and thus a 
violation of the rule's intended purpose. A salary cap is a great tool to use in promoting 
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-competitive balance, but the misuse of a previous rule, such as the 60/40 rule, will not do 
anything to change balance. A salary cap must be put in place to deal with strictly player 
compensation. The economic structure of baseball is shaky, but with the new de facto 
salary cap, it is even more unstable than ever. 
Contraction 
In recent months, the word contraction has been tossed around Major League 
Baseball to the point where the United States Senate had to get involved. Contraction is 
the elimination of a team from the league. In this case, Major League Baseball proposed 
to eliminate 2 teams to maintain an even number of teams in the league. Teams leading 
in the race to contract are the Montreal Expos, Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins, and the 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays. Major League Baseball would purchase the two teams from the 
owners and then eliminate them. This will only work if the owners of the clubs get fair 
market value for them. The problem facing this is the possible relocation of teams to new 
cities and different markets. This drives the price of the franchise up. Contraction is 
simply more than just buying the teams; it has many liabilities to take into consideration. 
One potential problem is the unexpired portion of the stadium leases of the teams that are 
being eliminated. Another liability is the unexpired portion of player's long-term 
contracts if that player does not make another major-league roster.11 2 The contraction of 
two major league teams would result in the elimination of twelve minor league 
franchises. The total cost of the buyout could range between $50-$75 million. l13 The 
112 Economics of Baseball forum, Noll, pg 5 
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-contraction of two major league teams could cost baseball over $500 million which will 
only add to the already weak economics of baseball. 
Although contraction would be expensive, it could also be beneficial because it 
will add to the revenue of the central fund that goes to all teams. In addition, the two 
weak teams will no longer receive the subsidies under the current revenue sharing plan. 
For example, Montreal pays in $3 million to the revenue sharing pool and receives $28 
million. The contraction of this franchise will provide more money for the teams trying 
to compete. 
Contraction has never taken place in baseball ever before. This causes a problem 
because the reaction that unfolds after contraction is unforeseeable. Because Major 
League Baseball has not contracted before, the effects of folding two teams are unknown, 
unless, of course, contraction precipitates another strike, in which case the losses to 
baseball will be far greater than any of the costs and benefits considered above. I 14 The 
motives of the owners could be in question. The first effect of contraction by the owners 
could be the idea that contraction might disrupt the unity of the players union. Another 
motive could be that the owners want to replace the relocation of teams with a formal 
expansion process. I 15 Another potential motive is to put more pressure on cities to pay a 
larger share of the cost of state of the art stadiums. 
Contraction mayor may not be the right answer. The owners are not planning to 
fold teams because it is financially solid for the game, but for the motives previously 
listed. Contraction is based on factors that are uncertain, and therefore contraction is at 
best a crapshoot. Whether or not the contraction of teams is going to be beneficial, the 
114 Economics of Sport, Noll, pg 9 
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financial structure of baseball will be shaken up. At best, Major League Baseball is 
rolling the dice, because it can not possibly know whether contraction will weaken the 
players union and cause cities to be more willing to subsidize baseball stadiums, while 
'd' . b . 116 avOl mg a negative response y Its customers. 
Reform of Major League Baseball 
There is no question that Major League Baseball is in serious jeopardy. With the 
currently unstable economic structure of the game, the simple existence of baseball as a 
mainstream sport could be in question. The only way to place baseball back at the top 
and once again as our "national pastime" is to change the current status of the game. 
In order to save baseball, a competitive balance must exist. The objective of 
competitive balance in baseball should be taken to mean a reasonable opportunity for all 
clubs, not equal outcome. Clubs should expect to be rewarded for good management, on 
and off the field, as well as by periodic good fortune. I 17 Economic reform is crucial to 
achieving this balance. Baseball's economic system must be regulated to ensure the 
existence of Major League Baseball. 
Enhanced Revenue Sharing 
The limited revenue sharing introduced in recent years has failed to promote 
adequate competitive balance, although it has enabled a handful of low payroll clubs that 
are not competitive on the field to become profitable. lIB Under the current revenue 
sharing plan, the redistribution of central revenue funds is not able to keep up with 
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expansion of local revenues. Thus, the revenue sharing has become ineffecti ve in 
creating competitive balance. Major League Baseball should share at least 40 percent, 
and perhaps as much as 50 percent, of all local revenues, after local ballpark expenses are 
deducted, under what is known as the straight pool plan.119 This will contribute to 
restructuring baseball's current economic status by sharing equally the local revenues, the 
revenues that separate the large market clubs and the small market clubs. The only 
problem with this is that some small market clubs will not try to become competitive and 
just take in the profits by saving payroll. In order to discourage clubs from using revenue 
sharing to become profitable without making proper effort to become competitive on the 
field, it is imperative that enhanced revenue sharing be coupled with an appropriate 
minimum club payroll. 120 
Enhanced Competitive Balance Tax and Minimum Club Payroll 
There should be a 50 percent competitive balance tax levied on payrolls of clubs 
that exceed $84 million while a minimum salary should be established at $40 million. 
The luxury tax of the 1996 Collective Bargaining agreement taxed those clubs over the 
$84 million dollar payroll mark, but failed to stop payrolls from skyrocketing. The 
competitive balance tax is simply an extension of the lUxury tax, with stiffer penalties. 
By taxing all clubs over the threshold, it seems that many teams will be deterred from 
creating the ungodly high payrolls. In addition to this tax, a minimum payroll 
requirement should be put into place. While the luxury tax tried to regulate escalating 
payrolls, the teams at the bottom in revenue were not forced to change their payroll ways. 
By enforcing a minimum payroll requirement, teams will be forced to used the newly 
119 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 38 
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acquired money in terms of increased revenue sharing on increasing their payroll. If 
compliance with the minimum payroll does not exist, then withholding of the revenue 
sharing shall ensue. I do believe that owners of clubs can see the benefit of reaching the 
minimum payroll simply in terms of receiving the extra monies from Major League 
Baseball. This concept has the potential to do three things: first, the tax should limit 
payroll increases by high payroll clubs, second, the lowest payroll clubs would face 
intense pressure to at least reach the minimum, and third, clubs in the middle would be 
tempted to increase payroll because they would have a greater chance to compete with 
high-payroll clubs. 
Salary Cap 
An aspect that floats around professional sports is the issue of a salary cap. While 
the plan of the increased revenue sharing and competitive balance tax are great, a salary 
cap would establish an aspect that is undisputable. The National Football League has a 
salary cap and their competitive balance is second to none. It is important to hold teams 
accountable for their spending. The NFL derives the salary cap figure from the sum of 
revenues from postseason games, national television revenues, and the income from NFL 
Properties and NFL films.l21 The salary cap was instituted in 1994 with a cap of $34.7 
million and the cap has since increased to $71.1 million for this year. That is a difference 
of $36.4 million in 8 years. This is important because the way the revenue is generated. 
The salary cap is based on the popularity of the sport, and all teams contribute to the 
sports popularity. Many baseball people argue that the salary cap does not allow the 
players to seek fair market value. The way I see it is that if the players perform, 
competitive balance exists, and the game of baseball is well received, then the salary cap 
121 Sports Business Journal, Desloge, pg 49 
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-will continue to rise, creating more money to offer to players. If the salary cap is 
introduced along with the minimum payroll and the competitive balance tax at a higher 
percent, than the competitive balance in baseball is bound to become more equal. 
Unequal distribution of Central Revenue Fund Revenues 
Another reform that can be instituted is distributing the Central Revenue Funds 
unequally. The commissioner of baseball has been granted the power to divide central 
revenue funds unequally. Major League Baseball should use unequal distribution of new 
Central Revenue Fund revenues to improve competitive balance by creating a 
"Commissioner's Pool" that is allocated to assist low revenue clubs in improving their 
competitiveness and in meeting the minimum club payroll obligations of $40 million. 122 
The revenue the low revenue clubs take in from the unequal distribution should be used 
only for player payroll. This will increase balance by forcing teams to spend the money 
on players, thus reaching compliance with the minimum salary policy. 
Draft Picks 
One main problem of the baseball is the stockpiling of great talent by clubs with 
high revenue. The problem lies in the inability of the low revenue teams to sign high 
priced talent because of their demands as well as buying the rights to negotiate with 
valued international players. Many of the nation's best players are passed up in the first 
picks because teams are afraid they will be unable to sign them. They end up drifting 
down toward the end of the round where the high revenue clubs, who can sign them, draft 
them, thus stockpiling the best talent. A competitive balance draft should be instituted to 
allow the lowest eight teams in terms of record the ability to draft one player not on the 
forty-man roster of the eight teams that made the playoffs. This process allows the low 
122 Blue Ribbon Report. pg 40 
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record teams the opportunity to get great talent, thus redistributing the talent throughout 
the league, thus creating balance. In addition, the inclusion of international players in the 
amateur draft will eliminate the bidding war to negotiate with high profile players, like 
Ichiro Suzuki. All teams would then have access to the worldwide market of talent. 
Also, the elimination of the compensatory draft picks for losing high salaried players to 
free agency will restore a true draft order. This allows the teams with worse records the 
first opportunity at the best talent. Finally, the changing of the opportunities for players 
to enter the draft would significantly change baseball as well. For example, players are 
allowed to enter the draft at any point in their college careers and immediately after high 
school, and still opt to return to college. If draft rules were developed, like football and 
basketball, the chances of highly talented players not signing with poor record clubs is or 
will be less likely to occur. Initiating the opportunity to only enter the draft after high 
school and once after your sophomore year in college, with no opportunity to go back to 
college after you have declared for the draft would make highly talented players sign with 
the team that drafted them. A player declaring after high school may still enter college if 
he so chooses. 
Franchise Relocation 
Franchise relocation should be an available tool to address the competitive issues 
facing the game. Clubs that have little likelihood of securing a new ballpark or 
undertaking other revenue enhancing activities should have the option to relocate if better 
markets can be identified. 123 This opportunity would help the game of baseball by 
providing better markets, and thus the opportunity to increase revenues and become more 
competitive. Perhaps the greatest example of this is the fact that Washington D.C. does 
123 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 43 
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not have a baseball team. The nation's capital is one of the largest media markets in the 
United States and could easily support a Major League Baseball team that would be able 
to generate enough revenue to compete. Owners should not be at the mercy of the 
citizens on whether he can put up a winning team or not. By allowing the relocation of 
teams, the following effects could occur: 
a. The club would be more financially capable to compete with high-revenue 
clubs in terms of on field performance 
b. To the extent that MLB's product is on-field competition, the product would 
be improved 
c. MLB as an industry would be operating in a better portfolio of markets and 
would generate more revenue 
d. The industry's revenue sharing plan would be improved in the sense that a 
greater portion of available revenue sharing plan dollars could be redistributed 
to remaining low-revenue clubs and/or the overall burden on payer clubs 
could be eased by some extent. 124 
In addition, if a team would relocate to a large market with an already existing team, then 
those revenues would be distributed more evenly and the large gap between large market 
and small market teams would not be as great. 
Contraction 
Contraction is a last ditch effort to save Major League Baseball's quickly 
deteriorating economy. If a team cannot find a city in which to relocate, and also cannot 
make enough money to survive, then the teams could be eliminated to save the league 
124 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 43 
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some money. But as previously stated, the league would probably not make any kind of 
significant amount of revenue. If the recommendations previously mentioned, then there 
is immediate need for contraction. 
Conclusion 
As far as I can determine, Major League Baseball is teetering on the verge of 
significant losses in fan base and revenue. Fans do not care about baseball, because 
baseball does not care about the fans! Significant reform is necessary for Major League 
Baseball to continue on as the "national pastime." 
Baseball's economic system has never been, is not, and should not be, a wholly 
unregulated market. Baseball, like all professional sports, has recognized that the drive 
for unbridled competition on the field must be harnessed or tempered by regulations 
designed to ensure fairness and the inherent need for cooperation among clubs with 
unequal economic resources to preserve the "league" as an institution.125 Without a 
competitive balance, Major League Baseball is nothing but a league of 8 teams vying for 
a championship, not 32, the way it has always supposed to be. 
Since the strike of 1994, baseball has become non-competitive and highly 
economic. Winning and losing is not based on the talent you have and how you manage 
it, winning and losing is based on how much money you have and how you spend it. 
Some serious reforms need to be implemented in order to save baseball. I feel, if the 
recommendations that I have provided in this thesis are used in Major League Baseball, 
the competitive disadvantage would dissipate and we would once again have a sport that 
125 Blue Ribbon Report, pg 37 
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-will be as much of the nation as anything else. Baseball has the power to transform 
dreams into realities and simply make people's lives better. Baseball has that power; it 
has always had that power. 
But still baseball lies in the depths of possible banishment from the hearts of 
Americans because the economics of the game create a competitive disadvantage and the 
fans association with teams as well as the teams' association with cities are dying because 
they go into every year knowing they cannot win. If we are shortsighted enough to say 
baseball does not need substantial economic reform until more data is in, the game will 
be in even worse trouble five or six years from now.126 I think that Bob Costas best 
described the current state of baseball with this analogy: "If you and I playa game of 
Monopoly and at the beginning of the game I'm given $10,000 and you're given 
$100,000, and I get Baltic and Mediterranean and you get Boardwalk and Park Place. 
And at the end of the game, I have $50,000. Well, I've made a profit, no question about 
it I've made a profit. Or even if I lose my $10,000 if I happen to be independently 
wealthy it doesn't matter to me. But nobody thought at the beginning of that game that I 
had a chance to win the game. Baseball, like all sports, has two bottom lines; and 
economic bottom line and a competitive bottom line. And based on that, the differences 
in the comparative wherewithal of teams now place some teams at a significant 
competitive disadvantage." 
126 Economics of Baseball, Costas, pg 5 
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